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The Islamic State, or ISIS, is more flexible and malleable than a traditional ‘state’ opponent, and it is a more durable, cohesive, and dangerous threat than any Al Qa’ida-associated formation has ever presented. The current set of analyses concerning how to combat the threat usually generate the conclusion of there needing to be ‘boots on the ground’, followed quickly by the a caveat stating the obvious – that this would be seen as a very bad idea if these boots were provided by Western powers, but perhaps this extraordinarily dangerous task could be taken up by some friendly regional allies, maybe from (as yet unspecified) Arab states, moderate Syrian opposition forces, or Kurdish forces that now operate in Iraq and in Syria. Yet none of these options would serve to challenge ISIS’s power. Indeed, their mobilising could actually make matters much worse.

It is also true that ISIS has significant weaknesses – not least in terms of it managing what could be a very large economy that contains many interest groups (tribes are often mentioned) that could turn against ISIS if their interests are not served.

This argument is being used to suggest that a new Arab tribal ‘awakening’, of the sort embraced and enhanced in Iraq in 2007-8 could be the political solution, alongside the bombing campaign. This is sound in theory, but in practice has been nullified by ISIS’ strategy of removing any internal threat to their predominance: by buying into their project key interest groups, and by ruthlessly oppressing those who oppose them.

So what could be done? Syria is without doubt ISIS’ key theatre, but engaging ISIS in Syria, beyond air strikes, is currently a fool’s errand. But Iraq is still important and Iraq is where the process of unravelling ISIS can begin, which is a good job, as the opportunity to do it in Syria, for the time being is not readily apparent. Why is Iraq so important to ISIS? Quite simply, if the Sunni Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq are not under their control, then they will be under the influence, if not direct control, of their opponents – whether in Baghdad, Washington DC, the Arab Gulf, or Ankara (although Ankara’s relationship with ISIS is profoundly murky).

The Kurds of Iraq, too, would rediscover their confidence and also work more effectively against ISIS, if they did not have to share a 1000km border with them on the over side.
For Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, control of Iraq is vital. It is also hugely symbolic. It was in Mosul, not Raqqa, that the Caliphate; was declared, and Mosul remains the biggest success story for ISIS. Nothing has been as impressive, and nothing has served to generate opposition to ISIS from Western powers quite so much as ISIS’ storming of the capital of Nineveh – and this remains an important wave for al-Baghdadi to surf. ISIS is as much about the power of symbols as it is the power of their weapons and the brutality of their control.

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